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BRADY VIOLATIONS: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK
AT “HIGHER STANDARD” SANCTIONS
FOR A HIGH-STANDARD PROFESSION
David E. Singleton*
“Great power involves great responsibility.”
—Franklin D. Roosevelt

Introduction
Discovery is the pre-trial process through which each party seeks to obtain
evidence from the opposing party or parties to assess witnesses, documents, and
exhibits the other side plans to use during trial. Essentially, it aids in preventing
surprises at trial. In a criminal trial, the discovery process is more stringent than in
a civil case.1 A prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose material information
that is potentially exculpatory.2 Otherwise, he or she runs the risk of violating
the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland.3
The Brady decision came down after several other cases began alluding to the idea
that prosecutors could no longer withhold evidence as part of a trial strategy. It
established the now well-known principle that prosecutors are required to disclose
all exculpatory evidence to the defense. Thus, Brady is a rule based on fundamental
fairness stemming from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
* 2014 Graduate, Wyoming College of Law. First, I would like to thank my two wonderful
and amazing boys, Dominick and Ayden. Without them, I would never have the drive to be where
I am today. Also, I would like to thank Professor Darrell D. Jackson for always pushing me to
critically analyze everything and to leave no answer unquestioned. He is an invaluable mentor and
friend. Thank you to Kellsie Nienhuser, for all of her input, edits, and patience. Last, thank you to
Brian Fuller, a friend I wish I had met sooner in law school, for his honesty, integrity, good nature,
and, of course, his input and edits.
1

See, e.g., Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1968).

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

3

Id.
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Amendments, and also helps avert potential violation of the protections that
“constitute the fundamental right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.”4
Specifically, a prosecutor violates Brady when he or she fails to disclose
exculpatory or impeaching information material to a defendant’s case.5 While
evidentiary disclosures have been a staple of criminal law since the beginning
of the American legal system, American courts adopted a higher standard for
prosecutors only about sixty years ago.6 The United States Supreme Court has
couched the protections of Brady within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 Because discovery is part of the defendant’s fundamental right, a
violation can occur “when the rigid application of such evidentiary rules precludes
the defense from presenting probative exculpatory evidence.”8
There are two categories of violations: intentional and inadvertent. This
article, however, examines only unintentional violations resulting from lack of
education, lack of experience, or neglect. More specifically, this article proposes
a system of sanctions for prosecutors in light of the higher standard discussed in
Brady v. Maryland and later statutory mandates.9
The United States Supreme Court never expressed a set range of sanctions for
prosecutors who fail to comply with required Brady disclosure.10 From a practical
standpoint, once a trial is completed, the only useful remedy a court has is to order
a new trial with the previously withheld evidence available for consideration.11
With pre-trial violations, however, the court may order the prosecutor to reveal

Elizabeth Napier-Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 Yale L.J. 1450,
1450 (2006).
4

5

Id.

6

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of
Innocence, 100 Crim. L. & Criminology 415, 466 (2010) [hereinafter Jones].
7

8

Id.

9

See infra note 200 and accompanying text.

Jones, supra note 7, at 443; Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field, Part III, or What’s
on the Discovery Channel, 77 St. John’s L. Rev. 69, 74 (2003) (discussing the courts’ lack of
meaningful remedial action, specifically, the courts’ unwillingness to dismiss charges or provide
for any monetary or disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors. The article further argues that these
types of remedial actions should be permitted under the current laws because current remedies
simply do not do enough to prevent later wrongdoing and violations); see also Bennett L. Gershman,
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685, 685 (2006) [hereinafter Gershman 2006]
(discussing the failed Brady doctrine and how the courts continuously fail to enforce violations
when they are discovered).
10

Jones, supra note 7, at 443; Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field, Part III, or What’s
on the Discovery Channel, 77 St. John’s L. Rev. 69, 74 (2003); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on
Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685, 685 (2006) [hereinafter Gershman 2006].
11
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the evidence, grant a continuance to give the defense a fair shot at using the
exculpatory evidence, or even craft “strongly worded jury instruction[s].”12
Simply ordering the prosecutor to disclose the Brady evidence constitutes
more of a directive than a sanction because, in this scenario, the prosecutor
does not have to take any action beyond that already constitutionally mandated.
Under this scheme, the consequences of a prosecutor’s noncompliance with Brady
mirror those of compliance—disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense.
Therefore, simply compelling disclosure as a Brady sanction does not present a
potent deterrent to prosecutors. To encourage compliance with Brady disclosure
requirements and promote efficient use of time and resources in the criminal
justice system, courts must do more than grant new trials and continuances to
address Brady misconduct.
While some argue that a “Fair Trial Remedy” would prevent prosecutors from
abusing their authority and ensure a fair trial for the defendant, the problem has
become far too prevalent.13 Typically, if a defendant can identify a Brady violation
early on in the trial process, the court could instruct the jury on Brady law and
further permit the defendant to argue that the violation raises reasonable doubt.14
This, however, is not enough. While there is certainly no issue with giving the
defendant a meaningful opportunity to address the violation, the ultimate focus
is best placed on preventative and educational measures to deter prosecutors from
committing these violations—mistakes.
Brady violations can be intentional—arguably malicious.15 More often
though, the violations are accidental: the prosecutor overlooks some minutiae of
the case.16 Either way, prosecutors must be put on notice and held accountable
for their actions. Thus, something akin to criminal sanction would constitute an
appropriate deterrent because, in effect, such a sanction would raise the stakes for
prosecutors throughout the justice system. While the standard remedy for a Brady
violation is a new trial or a continuance, courts should “not follow the general rule
if the remedy will likely result in further prejudice to the defense.”17
12

Jones, supra note 7, at 421.

13

Elizabeth Napier-Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 Yale L.J. 1450 (2006).

14

Id.

15

U.S. v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 910, 913–14 (10th Cir. 1994).

William S. Sessions and Robert M. Cary, Putting Justice Above Victory, Wash. Times (Oct.
13, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/13/sessions-and-cary-putting-justiceabove-victory/; Atina Roberts, Hunt Trial Clarified, Moberly Monitor-Index (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.moberlymonitor.com/article/20141016/News/141019263.
16

17
See United States v. Wilson, 720 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting mistrial
is generally the remedy for a Brady violation). See also U.S. v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1087
(9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to grant mistrial). “[The desired] remedy would advantage the government, probably allowing it to salvage what the district court viewed as a poorly conducted
prosecution.” Id.
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This article advocates stiffer penalties for Brady violations than are currently in
effect. Although every state has adopted professional rules of conduct and rules of
criminal procedure, violations are excessive.18 However, disciplinary charges and
meaningful sanctions are rarely applied.19 While the courts’ and advocates’ goal is
to prohibit Brady violations, thus far they have failed to meet that goal—largely
due to a lack of enforcement.20 At present, existing incentives are insufficient to
induce abstention from Brady-type misconduct.21

I. Background
A. History of Brady Violations
In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court first held “suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”22 At its core, a Brady violation is
a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 As a result,
the Supreme Court now imposes broad disclosure requirements on prosecutors.24
Both the facts and the law resulted in curious decisions in Brady v. Maryland.25
Brady openly admitted to his participation in the murder and the prosecution
presented overwhelming evidence of his guilt.26 At trial, he further admitted his
complicity in the planning and commission of the crime, but denied having
personally committed the killing and claimed his co-defendant committed
the killing, thereby fulfilling the legal requirement of the felony murder rule.27
Defense counsel also admitted his client’s guilt at trial, and told the jury
they could find him guilty, but they should forego the death penalty due to
his lack of culpability.28 Ultimately, a Maryland jury convicted Brady of firstdegree murder.29
18
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper
Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 716 (1987).
19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

23

Id. at 86.

24

Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct 213 (7th ed. 2006).

Gershman 2006, supra note 10, at 692 (detailing the intricacies of the facts of the Brady
case and explaining the oddities in the case that led to the Maryland Court of Appeals ultimate
decision to remand on the sole issue of punishment).
25

26

Id.

27

Brady, 373 U.S. at 84; see also Rosen, supra note 18, at 699.

28

Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.

29

Id.
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Before trial, counsel asked to see all of Brady’s co-defendants’ statements
to police.30 The prosecutors provided most of the documents and records,
but withheld one critical piece: 31 a statement revealing that one of Brady’s
co-defendants admitted to committing the murder.32 However, the prosecutor’s
failure to disclose the isolated statement made by Brady’s accomplice was arguably
inadvertent and likely had only marginal relevance to his punishment.33 After the
trial, defense counsel raised the issue, demanding a new trial, and the trial court
denied the motion.34
After being convicted and sentenced, a lower appeals court affirmed the trial
court’s decision.35 Yet again, Brady was unsuccessful. He submitted a motion to
the trial court to set aside the judgment.36 However, the trial judge denied the relief
based on his belief that the evidence would have been inadmissible anyway.37 The
Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the prosecutor’s suppression
of the accomplice statement violated Brady’s right to due process, and the court
remanded the case solely on the issue of punishment, leaving the issue of guilt
out.38 The court further stated, “withholding of material evidence, even ‘without
guile,’ was a denial of due process and that there were valid theories on which the
confession might have been admissible in Brady’s defense.”39
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Brady’s
claims that the suppression of his accomplice’s confession and ultimate denial
of constitutional rights destroyed the entire trial process.40 The Court affirmed
the Maryland Court of Appeals decision and held that suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused was itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process,
requiring a new trial.41 However, the Court stood by the appellate court’s decision
to remand only on the issue of punishment, rather than guilt or innocence.42

30

Id.

Id. (finding that the prosecution had withheld Brady’s co-defendant’s extrajudicial
statements admitting to committing the homicide. This piece of evidence did not become available
to the defense until after Brady was tried, convicted, and sentenced).
31

32

Id.

33

Gershman 2006, supra note 10, at 692.

34

Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.

35

Boblit v. State, 154 A.2d 434, 435 (Md. 1959).

36

U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

37

Id.

38

Gershman 2006, supra note 10, at 692.

39

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 105.

40

Id.

41

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

42

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
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Moreover, the Court made special note that defense counsel specifically requested
the evidence and it met the materiality standard.43
In U.S. v. Agurs, the United States Supreme Court revisited the Brady standard,
stating, “there is, of course, no duty to provide defense counsel with unlimited
discovery of everything known by the prosecutor.”44 The duty only applies if
the subject matter of such a request is “material.”45 In addition, “if a substantial
basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to
respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the
trial judge.”46

B. Three Types of Brady Violations
In Agurs, the United States Supreme Court further defined the scope of Brady
violations.47 The Court discussed three types of violations that fell within the
scope of Brady: (1) perjured testimony; (2) specific requests; and (3) general
requests.48 First, the Court described undisclosed exculpatory evidence
demonstrating the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony, and the
prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.49 This type of violation,
the Court stated, is fundamentally unfair and violates due process.50 Thus, a
conviction based on knowingly perjured testimony must be set aside if there is
any reasonable likelihood the testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury.51 Indeed, this type of violation “involve[s] a corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process.”52
Second are cases in which the prosecutor receives a specific request from
the defense for exculpatory evidence, but fails to turn it over.53 Specific requests
from the defense are generally pre-trial requests for certain pieces of evidence—as

43

Id.

44

Id. at 106.

45

Id.

46

Id.

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; Rosen, supra note 18, at 707 (discussing the Court’s mandate to
lower courts in dealing with these issues as they arise. Additionally, because these three categories
arose out of the Agurs opinion, the author further explains the interplay between the different types
of requests and the issue of materiality).
47

48

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.

Id. (discussing the type of prosecutorial misconduct from Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935)).
49

50

Id.

51

Rosen, supra note 18, at 707.

52

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.

53

Rosen, supra note 18, at 707.
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illustrated in Brady itself.54 These requests give the prosecutor notice of exactly
which evidence the defense attorney seeks.55 However, the evidence the defense
seeks must also be material, meaning it must affect the outcome of the trial.56
Once the prosecutor receives the request, he or she determines the materiality
of the requested evidence.57 If it appears the requested evidence is not material,
the prosecutor may bring the issue to the judge.58 In these cases the court
should address all requests, even though not every request will be material to the
issue of guilt.59 These type of violations based on specific requests are “seldom, if
ever, excusable.”60
Finally, a defense attorney may issue what the courts have called a general
request.61 This occurs when the defense attorney asks for “all Brady material” or
for “anything exculpatory.”62 Defense attorneys’ general requests, however, fail to
give adequate notice to the prosecution of the specific evidence requested.63 In
many cases exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may be
unknown to defense counsel, and a general request is the only tool left to him or
her.64 Thus, a prosecutor’s affirmative duty to turn over all material evidence upon
a general request comes from the exculpatory nature of the evidence.65 When
violations of these requests occur, courts should grant defendants new trials if the
suppressed evidence “creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”66
The common thread in all three situations is the Court’s implied requirement
of the defense’s knowledge, or at least assumption, of exculpatory evidence
withheld by the prosecution.67 The Court’s requirement of the defendant’s actual
knowledge should theoretically create an “appropriate adversarial balance that
places reasonable obligations on a defendant and enforces a prosecutor’s duty
to seek justice.”68 This standard is similar to a knew or should-have-known
54

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 106; Rosen, supra note 18, at 707.

57

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Rosen, supra note 18, at 707.

61

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.

62

Id. at 106.

63

Id. at 107.

64

Id. at 106.

65

Id.

66

Rosen, supra note 18, at 707.

Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 531, 557 (2007) [hereinafter Gershman 2007].
67

68

Id.
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requirement on the defense, calling for “reasonable diligence.”69 Despite a duty
on both parties, imposition of a knowledge requirement on the defense creates
an imbalance in favor of the prosecutor.70 This imbalance allows the prosecutor
to engage in “gamesmanship” and argue the defense did not exercise reasonable
diligence in an attempt to discover all evidence.71 Nevertheless, the Agurs Court
stated “if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives
the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if
no request is made.”72
The Court clarified this affirmative duty in Kyles v. Whitley: “[T]he pros
ecution’s affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant can trace
its origins to early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation and is of
course most prominently associated with this Court’s decision in Brady v.
Maryland . . . .”73 This is the essence of due process of law for the defendant.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct further bolster this affirmative
duty.74 “It became clear that a defendant’s failure to request favorable evidence
did not leave the Government free of all obligation.”75 In the end, “regardless of
request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its
suppression by the government…”76
Id. However, Gershman also mentioned the potential for the defense to also abuse this
so-called balanced approach. For example, a defendant with actual knowledge of suppressed
evidence could possibly wait to expose the violation and consequently “sandbag” the prosecutor.
This possibility permits the defense to “take a free ride” throughout the trial and if the outcome is
negative for the defense, it can take a second shot at a trial.
69

70

Id.

Id. Gershman noted that this “gamesmanship” has various consequences. First, when
the prosecutor shifts the focus away from his or her own duty to find suppressed evidence to
the defendant’s duty to find it, the prosecutor brings disrepute to himself and disrespect to the
profession. Second, this requirement forces the courts to scrutinize a defendant’s diligence and care
in searching out hidden evidence.
71

72

U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).

73

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1985).

74

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (1983). The rule states:
[The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:] make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of the tribunal…” The prosecutor in a criminal case shall make timely disclosure
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to
the prosecutor.

75

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433.

76

Id.
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C. The Bagley Materiality Requirement
As discussed above, part of the Brady standard involves a determination
of whether the evidence is material.77 However, the Brady Court left the issue
somewhat undefined. In U.S. v. Bagley, the United States Supreme Court
articulated the standard of materiality in Brady violation cases.78 Specifically, the
Court focused on cases where the prosecutor’s nondisclosure violates a defendant’s
due process and fair trial rights.79 Evidence is material only in instances where
there exists a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”80 As a starting
point, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the result at trial would
have been different had the suppressed evidence been included.81
The Court further clarified this standard in Kyles v. Whitley, stating, “the
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received
a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
Furthermore, the Court laid out a three-factor test to determine the materiality of
a piece of evidence: (1) the importance of the witness; (2) the significance of the
evidence; and (3) the strength of prosecution’s case.82
To avoid the inevitable distraction of trying to figure out why the prosecutor
may not have revealed evidence, the Court significantly departed from those cases
where the prosecutor intentionally withheld evidence.83 Instead, it measured the
effect of prosecutorial misconduct (whether intentional or inadvertent) on the
outcome of the trial and determined whether the failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence made the proceeding fundamentally unfair.84
However, what the courts failed to address in crafting the materiality
requirement is what metrics a prosecutor must use to decide what is actually
material to a particular case and its facts. Generally, a prosecutor’s estimation of
materiality does not rest on whether the evidence will be “favorable, helpful, or
advantageous to the defense; rather, the only question is whether the [evidence]
will be viewed by a court after the trial has been completed as being sufficiently
important that it is ‘reasonably probable’ that with the evidence the defendant
77

See supra notes 57– 60 and accompanying text.

78

U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 670 (1985).

79

Id.

80

Id. at 680.

81

Id. at 699.

82

Id.

Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 713, 761 (1999).
83

84

Id.
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would not have been found guilty.”85 It is not a prosecutor’s prerogative in
making a materiality determination to evaluate the credibility of a piece of
evidence because “to allow otherwise would be to appoint the fox as henhouse
guard.”86 A prosecutor may not unilaterally conclude that evidence is cumulative
or redundant.87 Thus, an unintentional Brady violation can easily stem from an
erroneous assessment of the materiality requirement.

II. Statutory Law
A. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Similar to the case law of Brady and its progeny, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter F.R.Cr.P.) require disclosure of requested evidence.88
Specifically, the F.R.Cr.P. require the prosecution to disclose, upon the defense’s
request, the defendant’s oral statements, defendant’s written or recorded statements,
defendant’s prior record, documents and objects, reports of examinations and
tests, and written summaries of any expert witnesses.89 Nevertheless, the F.R.Cr.P.
prohibit requests for disclosure of certain things.90
Conversely, the F.R.Cr.P. require certain disclosures from the defendant.91
Generally, this process becomes a quid pro quo exchange. If the defendant requests
disclosure of documents, then the defendant must allow the Government to
inspect the same types of items within defendant’s control that he intends to
use in his case-in-chief.92 Similarly, if the defendant intends to use reports and
examinations within the defendant’s possession, the same disclosure is required
85

Gershman 2007, supra note 67, at 549.

DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181, 195 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 440 (1985) (“[T[he criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s private deliberations, as the
chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations”); United States v. Alvarez, 86
F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is not the role of the prosecutor to decide that facially exculpatory
evidence need not be turned over because the prosecutor thinks the information is false.”).
86

See Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 301 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he prosecution has a duty
to disclose material even if it may seem redundant.”).
87

88

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.

89

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(G).

90

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). The rule states as follows:
Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as permitted by Rule 16(a)(1)(A)(D), (F), and (G), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the
government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting
the case. Nor does this rule authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made
by prospective government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.

Id.
91

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1).

92

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i–ii).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss1/5

10

Singleton: Brady Violations: An in-Depth Look at Higher Standard Sanctions f

2015

“Higher Standard” Sanctions

149

of the Government.93 However, this equal disclosure is limited. The F.R.Cr.P. also
shield certain information from disclosure.94 In fact, the rules prohibit disclosure
of reports, memoranda, or other documents made by the defendant or attorney
during the case’s investigation.95
Additionally, the F.R.Cr.P. impose upon each party a duty to continue to
disclose discovered evidence or material to the other party throughout the
proceedings.96 The rule also requires prompt disclosure to prevent any undue
delays and possible gamesmanship.97 This continuing duty, however, is only
required for evidence subject to discovery or inspection and the other party
previously requested or if the court ordered its production.98
The F.R.Cr.P. also provide a mechanism to regulate discovery.99 In the event
a party fails to comply with the requirements of the F.R.Cr.P., a court may
respond in a number of ways, including granting specific performance, granting
a continuance, prohibiting that party from introducing undisclosed evidence, or
entering any other order that is just under the circumstances.100
However, the F.R.Cr.P. lack a cogent manner of dealing with prosecutors once
a violation has occurred. Moreover, the statutory provisions and requirements
lack a mechanism to remedy the issue. It is true that this is not necessarily the
function of the F.R.Cr.P.; however, with the rise of Brady violations, some form of
penalty process needs to be memorialized and then followed.

III. Notable Examples of Brady Violations
The following two cases highlight the danger Brady violations present to the
legal system. Though many Brady violations occur every year, this article focuses
on only two particularly illustrative examples of prosecutors acting outside the
bounds of the profession.101
93

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B)(i–ii).

94

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(2).

95

Id.

96

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c).

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d).

100

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)(A)–(D).

See, e.g., The Ted Stevens Scandal, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 2009, at A18; In re Brophy, 442
N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1981); Patrick Malone, Tim Masters: State Should Pay for
Unjust Convictions, Coloradoan (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20130307/
NEWS01/303070048; see also Joaquin Sapien and Sergio Hernandez, Who Polices Prosecutors Who
Abuse Their Authority? Usually Nobody, ProPublica Journalism in the Pub. Interest (April 3,
2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/who-polices-prosecutors-who-abuse-their-authority101
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A. State v. Michael Morton
The State of Texas recently prosecuted former Williamson County District
Attorney Ken Anderson (later a Superior Court Judge) for violating state law
and acting in contempt of court.102 When trying Michael Morton’s case as a
prosecutor, Anderson possessed evidence that might have cleared the defendant,
Michael Morton, including statements from the only eyewitness to the crime
indicating that Morton was not the culprit.103 Anderson lied to a trial judge in
order to win a conviction in the murder case of State v. Morton.104 Just prior to trial,
the trial judge asked Anderson whether he was aware of any further exculpatory
evidence, and Anderson replied in the negative.105 In fact, Anderson was aware
of a police interview transcript that showed that the defendant’s three-year-old
son had witnessed the murder, and that the defendant was not home when the
murder occurred.106 Additionally, Anderson knew of reports by neighbors that
a man had parked a green van near the defendant’s home and had several times
walked into the wooded area behind the defendant’s house, which would have
corroborated the defendant’s theory the murder was the result of a burglary.107
The Texas court exonerated Morton twenty-seven years later.108 Anderson faced
charges of criminal contempt, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence,
and tampering with government records.109 After the court convicted Anderson,
he faced a fine of $500 and six months in jail on the charge of criminal contempt.110
Ultimately, the trial court held Anderson in contempt of court.111 Anderson
pled no contest to the charges as part of a plea bargain.112 The court sentenced

usually-nobody. The authors of the study examined cases from 2001 to 2011 in state and federal
courts, identifying those cases that included serious enough misconduct to overturn a defendant’s
conviction. In total, the journalists identified thirty cases meeting those criteria. Additionally, in
more than fifty cases the appeals courts held there was harmless error.
Mark Godsey, For the First Time Ever, a Prosecutor will Go to Jail for Wrongfully Convicting
an Innocent Man, Huffington Post (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-godsey/
for-the-first-time-ever-a_b_4221000.html.
102

103

Id.; In re Honorable Ken Anderson, No. 12-0420-K26 (D.Williamson Tex. Apr. 19, 2013).

104

Godsey, supra note 102.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.

Id.; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 21.002(a) (2003); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 37.09–
37.10 (2013).
109

110

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 21.002(b) (2003).

Chuck Lindell, Ken Anderson to Serve 10 Days in Jail, Statesman (Nov. 8, 2013) http://
www.statesman.com/news/news/ken-anderson-to-serve-10-days-in-jail/nbmsH/.
111

112

Id.
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Anderson to ten days in county jail.113 Additionally, the court fined him $500
and ordered him to perform 500 hours of community service.114 As part of an
elaborate agreement with the State, he agreed to give up his license to practice law
in exchange for the State dropping charges of evidence tampering.115

B. Michael Nifong
The next case of prosecutorial misconduct this article will explore involves
the 2006 prosecution of three Duke University lacrosse players for rape.116 In
that case, Michael Nifong prosecuted the players, but withheld exculpatory DNA
evidence that might have cleared the players’ names of all criminal charges.117
The North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Panel (hereinafter Panel) charged
Nifong with several counts of prosecutorial misconduct, including withholding
a complete report setting forth the results of all tests or examinations.118 In
addition, Nifong lied to the trial judge, and later the state bar investigators, about
the evidence withheld.119
In total, Nifong violated more than a dozen ethics rules during the
prosecution of the now-exonerated lacrosse players.120 The chairman of the Panel
speculated that Nifong’s conduct was politically motivated.121 Nifong’s continued
disregard of the law was due to his “hope” that the facts were as he imagined they
were.122 The Panel considered several aggravating factors, including: “a. dishonest
or selfish motive; b. a pattern of misconduct; c. multiple offenses; d. refusal to
acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct in connection with his handling of the
DNA evidence; e. vulnerability of the victims. . . ; and f. substantial experience in
the practice of law.”123 The Panel’s discussion of the aggravating factors seemed to
focus heavily on Nifong’s experience and relation to the profession and practice of
law, specifically, how his conduct resulted in “significant actual harm to the legal

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor Disbarred, CNN (June 17, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/
LAW/06/16/duke.lacrosse/.
116

117

Id.

N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
of Discipline, 06 DHC 35 (2007), available at http://www.ncbar.com/discipline/printorder.asp?
id=505.
118

119

Duke Lacrosse, supra note 116.

120

Id.

121

N.C. State Bar, 06 DHC 35.

122

Id.

123

Id.
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profession” and giving prosecutors in particular the reputation that they “cannot
be trusted and can be expected to lie to the court and to opposing counsel.”124
Ultimately, the Panel disbarred Nifong for his conduct.125
The chairman of the Panel stated “[this matter] has been a fiasco for a number
of people, starting with the defendants, and moving out from there to the justice
system in general.”126 The chairman mentioned the immense power a prosecutor
has in any case: “[T]he prosecutor, merely by asserting a charge against defendants,
already has a leg up.”127 Moreover, “the justice system only works if the people
who participate in it are people of good faith and respect those rights.”128

IV. Jurisdictional Experiments
A. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ) established the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) by order of the Attorney General dated December
9, 1975.129 The OPR ensures that DOJ employees perform their duties in
accordance with the high professional standards expected of the nation’s principal
law enforcement agency.130 To ensure this high level of performance, OPR reviews
DOJ attorneys’ exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal
assistance.131 Moreover, it acts as the disciplinary body when the investigations
discover misconduct.132
The DOJ may be the best example of an organization that has done a good
job of addressing the real problem in Brady violations—making a more honest
prosecutor.133 In U.S. v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that the
usual sanctions against prosecutors were “not necessary or appropriate” in all
cases.134 Among the reasons given, the Court noted that in the aftermath of a
124

Id.

125

Duke Lacrosse, supra note 116.

126

N.C. State Bar, 06 DHC 35.

127

Id.

128

Id.

Office of Professional Responsibility, 28 C.F.R. § 0.39 (2006). “The objective of OPR
is to ensure that the DOJ attorneys continue to perform their duties in accordance with the high
professional standards expected of the Nation’s principal law enforcement agency.” U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, OPR Objectives, http://www.justice.gov/opr/ (last
visited Feb. 5, 2015).
129

130

Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.39(a) (2006).

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009).

134

See id.
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violation, the prosecutor in that case was “contrite and furthered her education on
the subject of discovery obligations, and that the United States Attorneys’ Office
also implemented significant new initiatives.”135
Furthermore, the DOJ dutifully enforces the McDade-Murtha Amendment.136
This law requires federal prosecutors to follow relevant state laws and ethical
standards in effect where they conduct legal activities.137
The DOJ created a special manual specifically for prosecutors dealing with
criminal discovery.138 Additionally, federal regulations state and require that
“[e]ach employee [of the federal government] has a responsibility to the United
States Government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws
and ethical principles above private gain.”139 While not specifically directed at
prosecutors, the regulation applies to all federal employees, and it requires that
“[e]mployees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties.”140

B. States’ Approach to Brady Violations
The most common remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial where the
defense can introduce previously withheld evidence.141 However, some states have
sought to empower their disciplinary bodies and judiciaries. Generally, the courts
rely on three types of sanctions or remedies in an attempt to right the wrongs of
prosecutors who violate Brady: (1) contempt statutes; (2) criminal convictions;
and (3) statutory changes. First, there are contempt statutes.142 For example, in
Florida, the contempt statute reads, “in the exercise of their criminal jurisdiction
[the court] may punish for contempt as in the exercise of their civil jurisdiction.”143
Moreover, New Jersey courts have the power to punish for contempt specifically
in cases including the “misbehavior of any officer of the court in his official
transactions.”144 In Rhode Island, the courts have broad discretion to “punish for
any contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment or both.”145
135

Id.

136

Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government, 28 U.S.C. § 530(B) (1998).

137

Id.

Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Guidance for Prosecutors
Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors.
138

139

Basic Obligation of Public Service, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (2014).

140

Id. § 2635.101(b)(5).

141

Jones, supra note 7, at 443.

See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 900.04 (2014); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:10-1 (West 2014); R.I. Gen
Laws § 8-8-5 (2014).
142

143

Fla. Stat. Ann § 900.04 (2014).

144

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:10-1 (West 2014).

145

R.I. Gen Laws § 8-8-5 (2014) (emphasis added).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 5

154

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

Second, courts can rely on criminal convictions to punish prosecutors who
violate the requirements of Brady. In a federal case, the New York Court of
Appeals criminally convicted and fined—but did not disbar—a prosecutor for
his misconduct.146 In that case, the court upheld a lower court’s conviction of the
“misdemeanor of willfully depriving an individual of rights secured to him by the
United States Constitution in violation of sections 242 and 2 of title 18 of the
United States Code.”147 The court fined the lawyer $500.148 Despite the criminal
conviction, the court of appeals rejected the automatic suspension required under
state law for convictions of serious crimes.149 The court said that due to the
attorney’s previously unblemished record and the stigma of a criminal conviction,
a censure would be adequate.150
Third, courts, legislators, and executive branch can work together to fashion
statutes and rules that control and guide the behavior of prosecutors. For example,
Texas recently adopted a new discovery rule for prosecutors. In 2013, Governor
Rick Perry signed into law the Michael Morton Act (SB 1611) (hereinafter Act),
ushering a new era in discovery in Texas.151 Prior to the implementation of the Act,
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure required, essentially, the same disclosure as
all other jurisdictions—discovery of exculpatory evidence.152 However, the Texas
court’s devastating discovery of prosecutorial misconduct in the Michael Morton
case (discussed above) exemplified how hard it was for Texas prosecutors to follow
the discovery requirements.153
The Act requires a broader and more open discovery process.154 Specifically,
prosecutors now must turn over any evidentiary material related to any matter
involved in the action.155 Some critics say “open-file discovery [is not] a cure-all” and
could “have negative consequences,” leading to other types of gamesmanship.156
While the critics of the Act have a valid point, the issue of Brady violations is far

146

In re Brophy, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (1981).

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id.

Randall Sims, The Dawn of New Discovery Rules, The Prosecutor (July–August 2013),
http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/dawn-new-discovery-rules (last visited May 15, 2013).
151

152

Id.

153

Id.; see also infra notes 103 –16 and accompanying text.

154

Id.

155

Id.

Brian P. Fox, An Argument Against Open-File Discovery in Criminal Cases, 89 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 425, 443 (2013).
156
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too prevalent not to have some preventative measures.157 Indeed, the idea of an
open-file policy might be too much—but has the potential to be effective.
Despite contempt charges, criminal convictions, and statutes requiring greater
discovery, some prosecutors still fail to respect the discovery process. While each
of these sanctions serves a clear and important function, the real issue is the need
for well-trained prosecutors. They must learn and understand what the discovery
process requires of them. Punishment is only a corollary to the ultimate issue
of prevention.

V. Scholarly Approach
A. The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
The author of a 1960 law review note lamented the awkward requirements
of disclosure in an adversarial world of litigation.158 Despite the fact that the note
was written pre-Brady, the author captured the essence of the Supreme Court’s
words in that case. Consistent with the ideas in this article, the author also argues
for stiffer sanctions for prosecutors that engage in misconduct.
“When the prosecuting attorney violates his duty to disclose evidence
favorable to the defendant, the conviction secured thereby will be set aside.”159
However, the author went on to say that this remedy only gives relief to the
defendant without compelling the prosecutor to cease this conduct.160 Moreover,
because of the high-pressure situations most prosecutors face and the desire to
get the bad guy, breaches of the duty to disclose will not be discovered.161 Thus,
the author argued that some “counterbalancing penalty for breach of duty to the
accused may be desirable.”162
While civil suits for damages often represented the norm for a wronged
defendant, these suits were often ineffective, regardless of whether the criminal
defendant sued under the common law principle of malicious prosecution or

Rosen, supra note 18, at 716; Napier-Dewar, supra note 13, at 1458; see also The National
Registry of Exonerations Update, National Registry of Exonerations (April 3, 2013), http://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE2012UPDATE4_1_13_FINAL.pdf. The
study looked at exonerations resulting from prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, the study found
that these exonerations stemmed from perjury or false accusations fifty-two percent of the time and
professional misconduct forty-three percent of the time.
157

Case Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 Colum. L. Rev.
858, 870 (1960).
158

159

Id. at 868.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.163 The weak statistics are a direct result of the
immunity prosecutors enjoy as part of their positions—as long as they act within
the scope of their official duties, they are immune from a legal suit.164 Essentially,
courts reject penalizing prosecutors for doing their jobs and thereby creating a
perpetual fear of civil litigation for the prosecutor. Moreover, this reasoning is
applicable even when defense attorneys allege the action was willful and malicious.
The Note heavily suggested that prosecutorial misconduct was slipping
through the cracks.165 To that end, one possible sanction, in addition to civil suits,
could be “statutory provisions for the removal of a prosecutor from office extant
in most states.”166 Although uncommon, instances exist where prosecutors were
removed from office. Most often, by the time courts, defendants, or even later
prosecutors discover the Brady violations, the violating prosecutor is long gone
and the statutory provisions are largely ineffective.167
A recent investigative report by the Chicago Tribune examined 381 cases
for potential Brady violations.168 In the report, none of the homicide cases the
courts reversed led to sanctions against the errant prosecutors.169 “With impunity,
prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths and the law, committing
the worst kinds of deception in the most serious of cases.”170

163

Id.

See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In Imbler, the Court extended to prosecutors
similar immunity from suits brought against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the United States
Code, alleging suppression of exculpatory evidence or the presentation of false evidence. In the end,
the Court eliminated all potential civil liability as a deterrent.
164

165

The Duty of the Prosecutor, supra note 159.

166

Id. at 869.

Id. The average prosecutor only serves for a short period. In many cases, his breach of
duty is not brought before the court until many years later. See, e.g., Napue v. People, 360 U.S. 264
(1959) (twenty years); United States v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (twenty-five years);
People v. Fisher, 151 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1958) (twenty-five years); In re Morhous, 56 N.E.2d 79
(N.Y. 1944) (thirteen years). Again, the reader should keep in mind this is a pre-Brady world, and
certainly a time before DNA testing was even a possibility.
167

Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New Reflections on
White Queens, Hobgoblins and Due Process, 94 Ky. L.J. 220 n.25 (2005–06).
168

169

Id.

Id. (citing to Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice
Justice to Win, Chi. Trib., Jan. 10, 1999, at C1); see also Rosen, supra note 18, at 693; Fred C.
Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 721 (2001); Note, The Duty of
the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 858 (1960).
170
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VI. A New Approach to an Old Problem
Each year, a multitude of cases involve allegations of Brady violations.171
Many cases go unreported.172 Indeed, this article does not intend to catalog all of
the reported cases that contain Brady violations. Rather, it aims to suggest a new
method and mechanism for disciplinary determinations in cases of unintentional
violations. Not every prosecutor is guilty of an ethical violation. Nonetheless,
disciplinary bodies must determine the guilt that attaches, if any. Brady violations
constitute a recurring problem that disciplinary bodies fail to adequately address.173
To grasp the importance of the disciplinary rules that prohibit misconduct,
an understanding of other methods used to punish such misconduct aids this
article’s analysis. Some Brady violations result in reversal, or another similar
trial remedy.174 Nevertheless, reversal has not served to deter prosecutors from
further violations, and sanctions such as criminal prosecution or removal from
office are rarely, if ever, used and have little deterrent value.175 Courts are generally
reluctant to use heavy criminal sanctions, even in the most egregious instances of
prosecutorial abuse, possibly preferring a quasi-criminal remedy.176 For example,

For discussion of other reported cases involving Brady violations, see Comment, Prose
cutorial Misconduct: A National Survey, 21 DePaul L. Rev. 422 (1971); Annotation, Withholding
or Suppression of Evidence by Prosecution in Criminal Case as Vitiating Conviction, 34 A.L.R.3d
16 (1970); Annotation, Right of Accused in State Courts to Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in
Possession of Prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8, 32–36 (1966); see also Annotation, Right of Accused to
Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in Possession of Prosecutors, 52 A.L.R. 207 (1928) (pre-Brady cases
involving defendant’s rights to discovery).
171

172
Recent Cases, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1019 (2010) (citing Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d
293, 313 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (Prado, J., writing to affirm)).
173

Rosen, supra note 18, at 703.

Some of the most notable cases resulting in reversal were U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
674 (1985); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675–76 (2004); and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
454 (1985). In the latter two cases, the United States Supreme Court held that the Brady violations
were so flagrant and inexcusable that reversal was required even under the Court’s more prosecutorfriendly standard. See Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1083, 1086 (1994). Ms. Morton
discusses and compares the possibility of remedial trial tactics as a means to right the prosecutorial
wrong. Essentially, she argues courts can, as an alternative to direct discipline, suppress other
evidence or dismiss the charges entirely. However, she goes on to state that often the government
can overcome the remedial tactics with a showing that the misconduct will result in simple
harmless error.
174

175

Rosen, supra note 18, at 697.

Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 45,
84 (2005). Ms. Dunahoe discusses the potential reluctance of judges and juries to seek criminal
sanctions for “technical” violations; rather, using a court’s contempt power would be more beneficial
and economical. While she specifically discusses intentional violations, her distinction of “technical”
constitutional violations is indicative of a general and acceptable form of scaling the severity of a
Brady violation.
176

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 5

158

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

in the Brophy case, the New York Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s
suspension of Brophy’s license, basing its decision on the fact that Brophy had
an “otherwise unblemished record” and had already faced the “stigma of a
criminal conviction.”177 The Brophy decision continues a tradition of lack of
accountability and educational rehabilitation.
Courts have also said that granting a new trial for the defendant is a form
of punishment.178 In Kyles, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “even
a negligent suppression of evidence could require a new trial depending on
how much the suppression harmed the defendant.”179 The court made a direct
correlation between the gravity of the harm caused and the severity of the remedy
fitting the transgression.180 Throughout the discussion, the court meted out a
range, or scale, of punishments for Brady violations based on notions of fair
play.181 Even still, because of materiality standards, “a prosecutor knows that a
decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not necessarily
result in a reversal of the conviction.”182 While this type of remedy is certainly
important for the defendant, this example serves another purpose. The courts
generally consider varying degrees of Brady violations to exist. As such, the courts
should also consider similarly varying degrees of punishments as appropriate,
including criminal sanctions.
In 2006, Elizabeth Napier argued that another remedy is appropriate in cases
where the defendant’s rights are at stake because of undiscovered evidence.183
Her argument centered on the idea that because defendants would rarely find
out about hidden evidence, violations go undiscovered without remedy.184
Moreover, once an appellate court considers a case and finds that a prosecutor
suppressed evidence, the cookie-cutter response is to say the error was harmless.185
Thus, because of appellate review mechanisms, the courts rarely vindicate a
defendant’s rights.186 Indeed, the prosecutor rarely suffers a serious penalty for
his or her misconduct.187 Often, however, when courts take remedial measures,

177
Brophy v. Comm. on Prof ’l Standards, 83 A.D.2d 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Rosen, supra
note 18, at 726.
178

Kyles, 297 F.2d at 507.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Rosen, supra note 18, at 707.

183

Napier-Dewar, supra note 13, at 1458.

184

Id. at 1452.

185

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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the government easily overcomes such measures by showing that the prosecutor’s
conduct was harmless error.188
As such, a remedy for the defendant is not sufficient to deter prosecutors
who violate Brady. Unlike a criminal prosecution, which imposes society’s moral
condemnation on a person, punishing a prosecutor by granting the defendant relief,
such as excluding evidence or dismissing charges, does not necessarily vindicate
the interests of the community.189 While intentional violations are egregious,
the unintentional violations should also trigger a remedy to discourage such
misconduct in the future. A remedy granted solely to deter future prosecutorial
misconduct can lead to incongruous results, such as the dismissal of charges when
it is likely that the defendant is guilty of the crime or reversal of a conviction
when the proceeding was otherwise fair.190 Nevertheless, finding improper intent
without meting out punishment gives the impression that the courts are powerless
in the face of prosecutorial misuse of authority.191
Napier certainly makes a persuasive suggestion that criminal sanctions do little
to help a defendant immediately.192 While her contention that any higher penalty
will fail as an effective deterrent is misplaced, the argument is not without merit.
Nevertheless, her conclusion that some other sanction—somewhere between bar
censure and criminal sanctions—is not a beneficial or effective deterrent is mere
speculation and conjecture.
Additionally, because the legal profession imposes a higher standard on
prosecutors, they have a duty to prosecute effectively and with integrity.193
However, prosecutors sometimes ignore evidence they find immaterial. As stated
above, the parties’ knowledge of the evidence is the touchstone of Brady.194 To be
sure, courts continue to warn prosecutors who may lack knowledge of exculpatory
evidence that they have a continuing constitutional and ethical duty to learn
about its existence.195

188
Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression,
Dismissal, or Discipline, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1083, 1086 (1994).
189
Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 Wash. U. L. Q.
713 (1999).
190

Id.

191

Id.

192

Napier-Dewar, supra note 13, at 1458.

Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 Fordham L. Rev.
1205, 1206– 07 (2000).
193

194

Gershman 2007, supra note 67, at 557.

195

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

21

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 5

160

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

A claim of ignorance offers a prosecutor a convenient opportunity to cover up
a mistake. Ignorance, however, is no excuse.196 A criminal defendant who claims
to be unaware of a law does not receive leniency.197 Indeed, prosecutors—people
well versed in the law—do not deserve any leeway for their shortcomings, even if
they bury their heads in the proverbial sand. Additionally, a prosecutor claiming
ignorance of Brady evidence as an excuse for non-compliance does not deserve
a less-demanding standard.198 This article addresses the failure of the standard
remedy in Brady violations.
Moreover, the quintessential, and standard, remedy for a Brady violation—
reversal of a conviction—is lackluster at best. Because of the Court’s materiality
requirement in Bagley, a prosecutor likely knows that a decision to commit a Brady
violation will not necessarily result in a reversal of a conviction.199 Also, a prosecutor
who commits Brady violations likely does not start doing so intentionally. It is
difficult to believe that a new prosecutor, recently graduated from law school,
walks into court for his or her first trial and says, “I’m going to withhold all of
this exculpatory material.” Rather, the more likely scenario is that he overlooked
or did not understand a piece of evidence the way a seasoned prosecutor would.
Essentially, the idea is to catch, address, and fix unintentional Brady violations
before they turn into purposeful violations that require a stiffer penalty.
A more appropriate sanction should address the gap left by state bar
associations, prosecutor’s offices, and courts. Because most state bar association
sanctions amount to a private censure, it is clear that in order to create a legal
community that does not accept or turn a blind eye to violations, whether
accidental or willful, a more severe penalty is necessary. This is not to say that
criminal sanctions are appropriate in all cases. What would the courts charge
the prosecutors with? Where would it fit in the criminal code? The courts and
bar associations must find a middle ground for sanctions that address the real
need—prosecutor education—in light of the higher standard imposed on
all prosecutors.200
On the continuum, there exist two ends: (1) bar sanctions, to whatever
degree; and (2) criminal penalties (something akin to obstruction of justice
and contempt). Obviously, neither extreme cleanly fits most situations,
especially when the violation is unintentional. Therefore, this article argues for a
middle ground.
196
Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (establishing the general rule that ignorance of
the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American
legal system).
197

Id.

But see David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 Geo. L. J. 957, 976 (1999) (“[I]n legal ethics,
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The ideal sanction would operate in a manner similar to driving citations
or infractions—a graded scale of infractions, with cumulative penalties. Like a
driver’s license, a prosecutor’s license would be subject to a point system. For
each violation—depending on the severity—the reviewing body could record the
points assigned for the violation in the attorney’s personal file. Each subsequent
violation would result in accrual of additional points. For each accumulation of
points, the sanction, punishment, etc., would be commensurate with the amount
of points.
For example, a first offense of an unintentional Brady violation would
amount to two points. Consequently, two points would amount to a warning.
Similar to the current situation that occurs in a private censure—by most state bar
associations—the reviewing body or bar association would talk to the prosecutor
and record the violation in his or her permanent file, all in a private manner.
Additionally, because of the importance of educating the prosecutor, remedial
continued legal education (CLE) would be required.
For this first violation, a four-hour CLE would be appropriate.201 The CLE
would focus on the need for and the importance of the higher standard imposed
upon prosecutors. The hope would be that prosecutors would appreciate and
understand the nature of the standard, the basic requirements of Brady, and the
relevant state rules of criminal procedure. The CLE could use the federal Office
of Professional Responsibility as a model and provide a guidebook of proper
execution of evidentiary discoveries.202
Each violation would escalate from there with corresponding penalties. The
overall idea would be to educate the prosecutor each time a violation occurs.
Contrary to the differentiation of violations in the driving code, each type of
Brady violation is not dissimilar in the effect on the defendant—unfair
prejudice—and thus, should not be treated differently in the remedial education
of the prosecutor. In the end, the only relevant distinction is whether the violation
is intentional or unintentional—a distinction best discussed in another article.
The state bar association would track the number of points in an attorney’s
file. Once an offender accrued a certain number of points, decided by each state,
the offender’s license would be restricted. For example, two violations within a
one-year period would require placement of the offender on a probation period
of one month. This may sound unworkable, but it puts the office on notice, as

201
The CLEs would operate similar to the “Alive at 25” driving education program many states
employ. See National Safety Council: Alive at 25 Program, https://aliveat25.us/ (last visited Jan.
22, 2015). The National Safety Council created a four-and-a-half-hour driver’s awareness course for
young drivers between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, with a curriculum including lessons on
defensive driving, decision-making, and taking responsibility. Id.
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well. It requires accountability of the offender and everyone else in the office. The
offender could still perform research, writing, and everyday duties, but similar
to a third-year law student, he or she would need immediate supervision for
everything done in court.
For subsequent violations—those occurring after a one-year violation-free
period—the offender would be automatically subject to review by a reviewing
agency (most likely state bar associations) for possible temporary suspensions.
Obviously, this gives great discretion and oversight to the reviewing body. The
reviewing body would already have the accumulation of points and completion
(or not) of CLEs to direct their decision. If, based on the reviewing agency’s
decision, the offender’s license is suspended, further CLE requirements would be
imposed. However, in this instance, the offender would be required to demonstrate
competency to the reviewing agency after the suspension period ends. Essentially,
the agency’s hands are tied unless and until the offender fulfills all requirements to
reinstate his or her license. Reinstatement should require intensive CLE, remedial
training, and a real-life scenario test. The real-life scenario test would determine
whether the offender has adequately learned the knowledge necessary to enter
the practice and have his or her license and privileges reinstated. Drivers who
violate the rules of the road are required to fulfill similar requirements, including
studying for the test, taking the written test, and then actually driving with an
instructor after license suspension or revocation. If the driving system permits
rehabilitation and adequate testing for every person who attains the age of sixteen,
the same is possible for the limited number of licensed prosecutors.
The review board could give a prosecutor a scenario that he or she would
then have to navigate to a successful outcome.203 The prosecutor would receive a
case file with a litany of discovery issues. Upon review, he would have to parse out
what is discoverable under Brady, its progeny, statutes, and relevant state rules.
The test would include discovery requests from a defense attorney as well. In the
end, the goal is to sufficiently rehabilitate the offender with adequate education
such that he makes the right decisions. The test would place attorneys in
ethically compromising situations, and set high expectations for their exercise of
discretion. Ideally, the prosecutor would make the best choice to serve justice, fairly
try the defendant, and achieve the higher standard of professional responsibility
required of all prosecutors.

203
This scenario is similar to the Multistate Performance Test the National Conference of Bar
Examiners administers to law school graduates each year. See Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners,
The Multistate Performance Test, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpt/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2015). It is wholly practical for the profession to rehabilitate prosecutors the same way it admits
them to practice law.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, holding prosecutors to a higher standard should not punish society
for the misdeeds of a prosecutor.204 Rather, the Court’s focus was always to facilitate
a fair trial for the accused.205 Indeed, “Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”206 The parties’ knowledge of
exculpatory evidence is the touchstone of the Brady decision.207 One jurist even
stated that despite a higher standard and imposition of a duty, “the game will go
on, but justice will suffer.”208 The suggestions above and the scheme of remedial
sanctions foster a growth and implementation of knowledge such that prosecutors
are empowered to make the right decisions. They will have a better understanding
of the inherent fairness required of both the profession and the trial process, and
they will move away from the gamesmanship so many fear.
In the end, the focus should not be on punishment, but rather on education,
reintegration, and achieving a high standard for all prosecutors. Additionally,
because there would be less focus on punitive sanctions, prosecutors would
be inclined to self-report a violation: a motivation that, until now, has been
nonexistent. The idea of self-reporting would also get away from the idea that
stiffer penalties would create a chilling effect on the profession. If prosecutors
knew that when they accidentally mess up they would be educated and guided
rather than punished, it seems logical that they would be more amenable to
revealing a violation.
The practice of law, writ large, has a reputation as deceptive—full of shady
characters and hired guns. While this article cannot possibly affect the entirety
of the profession, the suggestions within can and should reach at least the
prosecutors—reach prosecutors who swore to protect the people, serve the people,
and uphold the law.209 Prosecutors are held to a higher standard of practice, one
that should not be shirked for the possibility of a better or quicker conviction.210
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To be sure, the ideas and suggestions in this article are lofty. Furthermore, it is
naïve for anyone to think that changes in disciplinary structure and enforcement,
alone, are enough to deter prosecutorial misconduct. However, the ideas and
suggestions are workable and customizable for each state. The baseline standard
set out in Brady and its progeny cannot be forgotten or lessened. Prosecutors
are the servants of the people, the protectors, and wield a great sword. But they
also need to be their own shield—that is what the standard, and society, expects
of them.
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